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The attainment or maintenance of personal control (which can involve 
either the environment or the self as a target) is a fundamental human motivation 
(Skinner 1996). As such, the desire for personal control will be heightened when 
situational cues suggestive of the attainment of control are present or when 
control perception is threatened. Based on this assumption, this dissertation 
asserts that as the control motive is triggered, people tend to exercise/attain 
control through situations that are 1) more ambiguous or 2) more hedonically 
unpleasant. While the first instance promotes ambiguity seeking behaviors (which 
violate the ―uncertainty reduction‖ norm), the second instance prompts behaviors 
towards seeking negative experience (which violates the ―hedonism‖ norm).  
Two essays tested the above two proposed effects as well as their 
underlying mechanisms respectively. Essay 1 examined how opportunity to exert 
effort, referred to as having a potential behavior of relevance to a particular 
outcome, affected ambiguity seeking behaviors.  Extant literature suggests that 
people generally tend to avoid taking risks with vaguely specified probabilities. 
Other research, however, has shown that this propensity to avoid ambiguity can 
sometimes be neutralized and even reversed. The current essay contributes to the 
latter stream of work by examining a decision task characteristic (i.e., opportunity 
to exert effort) and how it promoted ambiguity seeking behaviors. 
Based on the personal control literature, people generally perceive greater 
control when they exert effort on their own. I argue that this perceived control 
would be more likely to transform into greater outcome expectancy when the 
outcome information is represented ambiguously (as ranges of probabilities). 
Therefore, individuals would prefer the ambiguous option (vs. ambiguous option) 
due to the greater outcome expectancy over the ambiguous prospect. I tested this 
account in a range of settings from choice of gamble to choice of product.  
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Aside from situational cues being able to externally trigger the motivation 
for personal control, previous research has also shown that emotional states can 
be internal triggers of such motivation. Essay 2 examines when and why one of 
these emotional states–guilt arising from self-control failure (which suggests a 
lack of control/competence), would lead to seeking negative experience. Prior 
research has mainly focused on guilt arising from social transgressions (e.g., 
harming other persons), and explained that people may engage in one kind of 
negative experience (e.g., physical pain) to get rid of guilt (i.e., affect-regulation 
view).  
The current essay, however, offers a goal-regulation account. I argue that 
people experiencing guilt after self-control failure would resort to negative 
experience (including forgoing pleasure and seeking pain) to ensure future goal 
success. Consistent with this goal-regulation view, we found that people 
experiencing guilt were more likely to seek negative experience when they 
believed negative experience is instrumental to goal success, when they wanted to 
persist with the unachieved goals, or when they believed their personal qualities 
could change over time.  
In summary, this dissertation investigates ambiguity seeking and negative-







WHEN OPPORTUNITY TO EXERT EFFORT LEADS TO AMBIGUITY 




Consumers are often faced with product information that ranges from 
precise to ambiguous. For instance, the probability that a particular brand of 
portable media player will need repair in the first year after its warranty ends 
might be represented in a precise (18%) or ambiguous (10%-26%) manner. How 
would the different representations of failure rates affect consumer preference? 
Past research on ambiguity preferences has documented a general propensity to 
avoid information ambiguity (Camerer and Weber 1992; Dolan and Jones 2004). 
For instance, in Ellsberg’s classic urn-and-marble experiment, participants 
generally prefer to bet on an urn that contains 50 red and 50 green marbles instead 
of an urn that contains an unknown proportion of red and green marbles (Ellsberg 
1961). This suggests that a media player that is perceived to have an ambiguous 
failure rate would be favored less than one with a precise failure rate. On the other 
hand, the literature also suggests that the propensity to avoid ambiguity can 
sometimes be neutralized or even reversed. The factors examined in such studies 
primarily relate to the characteristics of the probabilistic information, such as the 
center, range, or framing of the ambiguous probabilistic information (Curley and 
Yates 1985; Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; Kuhn 1997). In contrast, the current 
paper focuses on how a decision-task characteristic—the opportunity to exert 
effort—can promote a preference for ambiguity.  
We can illustrate this with the media-player scenario from above. Retail 
stores differ in their shelving policies: Several of the same items could be 
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displayed together, or only one placed on display, with additional stock elsewhere. 
As such, once customers have decided on a particular brand of media player, they 
can take one item freely off the shelf or rely on a store assistant to retrieve an item 
from the stock room respectively. We regard the former (latter) as having higher 
(lower) opportunity to exert effort, and suggest that consumers would evaluate 
ambiguous product information (e.g., a media player’s 10%-26% failure rate) 
more favorably given greater opportunity to exert effort.  
We advance a control-based account that proposes that when individuals 
believe they can achieve control through exerting effort in a decision task (e.g., 
self-picking a box of media player), the ambiguous choice option would seem 
more attractive because of the associated greater outcome expectancy (e.g., self-
picking a box of media player with a lower failure rate among similar boxes). In 
other words, when opportunity to exert effort is available, ambiguity-seeking 
tendencies may be more forthcoming. To our knowledge, this is the first effort 
that addresses ambiguity-seeking from the perspective of personal control. This is 
important, given that more research is needed to better understand the conditions 
under which individuals exhibit ambiguity-avoidance vs. ambiguity-seeking 
behavior (Camerer and Weber 1992). Such an investigation is especially 
meaningful given the ubiquity of ambiguous information in everyday decisions, 
as well as the inherent high or low opportunities to exert effort that characterize 
such decisions.  
We test our account with a range of settings, from choice of gamble to 
choice of product. We also document the underlying process by showing that the 
proposed effect is mediated by outcome expectancies and can be negated when 








Previous Accounts of Ambiguity Aversion/Preference 
 
Defined as uncertainty about probability, which is created by the absence 
of information that is relevant and could be known (Curley and Yates 1985; 
Frisch and Baron 1988), ambiguity has been extensively studied in both 
economics and psychology. Prior research has documented a general propensity 
to avoid ambiguity in various decision contexts (Camerer and Weber 1992; Dolan 
and Jones 2004). One account of ambiguity avoidance centers on the sense of 
incompetence it brings (Camerer and Weber 1992). In this respect, the tendency 
to avoid ambiguity can be either strengthened or weakened, depending on whether 
this sense of incompetence associated with the ambiguous option is highlighted 
(Fox and Tversky 1995) or eclipsed by other competence-related factors (Heath 
and Tversky 1991). For instance, the ―comparative ignorance hypothesis‖ (Fox 
and Tversky 1995) suggests that people tend to evaluate the ambiguous option 
(relative to the precise option) less favorably when both options are presented 
simultaneously than when each is presented singly. This is because the joint-
evaluation mode, relative to the separate-evaluation mode, allows people to more 
easily recognize their relative lack of knowledge about the ambiguous option. On 
the other hand, Heath and Tversky (1991) found that people who are 
knowledgeable about football prefer to bet on football matches over ―equi-
probable‖ games of chance, even though football matches involve greater 
outcome ambiguities than games of chance.  
Ambiguity is not always aversive, however; it may sometimes convey a 
sense of hope by allowing people to construe a better outcome. For instance, 
people are more likely to seek ambiguity when probabilities of gains are small or 
when probabilities of losses are large (Curley and Yates 1985; Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1985). Hogarth and Einhorn (1990) propose an anchoring-and-
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adjustment process in which individuals adopt an initial anchor and subsequently 
adjust for the ambiguous information. In this process, the ambiguous information 
is often adjusted with a certain bias in favor of the ambiguity-seeking behavior. 
Similarly, Kuhn (1997) showed that a loss frame (e.g., the chance that a car will 
need a major repair), compared to a gain frame (e.g., the chance that a car will be 
trouble free) of probabilistic information motivates greater ambiguity-seeking 
behavior. As people are generally averse to loss, the loss frame would trigger a 
greater desire to seek risk and be rewarded. Under such a circumstance, 
ambiguous information would appear favorable since it has the potential for 
decision makers to achieve a better outcome. Such potential offered by ambiguous 
information is also recently demonstrated by Mishra, Shiv, and Nayakankuppam 
(2008). Specifically, in a marble-and-urn experiment, they found that individuals 
are more optimistic about the outcome after they have drawn a marble from the 
urn (vs. before). This is so only when the proportions of different colored marbles 
in the urn are conveyed ambiguously (vs. precisely). The authors propose a goal-
based account that suggests that taking an action (i.e., drawing a marble) triggers 
a desire to feel good about the outcome, and an ambiguous prospect makes such 
goal-based reasoning possible.  
We complement previous explanations for ambiguity preference, which 
have primarily centered on ambiguous information characteristics or individual 
differences, by focusing on the contingency that arises from the presence or 
absence of an opportunity to exert efforts in decision tasks. This emphasis allows 
for direct examination of ambiguity preference at the pre-choice stage and offers 
greater understanding of how a task characteristic (e.g., the opportunity to exert 
effort) can influence consumer choice regarding options that include ambiguous 
information. 
 




The attainment or maintenance of control over the environment so as to 
meet an individual’s needs is a fundamental motivation (Friedland, Keinan, and 
Regev 1992; Heckhausen and Schulz 1995). The perception of having control 
largely hinges on the belief that events are influenced by and contingent on one’s 
own behavior and not fate, circumstances, other people, or uncontrollable 
physical forces (de Charms 1968; Rotter 1966). As such, exerting effort in an 
event may be seen as a necessary means of attaining and exercising control. 
Previous research has shown that to obtain a sense of control, people prefer to bet 
on a skill-related task (e.g., throwing darts) than on an equi-probable task of 
chance (Cohen and Hansel 1959). They may also rely on superstitious rituals to 
feel they have gained control over the external world (Keinan 2002). Even in 
tasks of chance, people generally prefer tasks that allow them to do something on 
their own than rely on someone else (Dunn and Wilson 1990; Gilovich, Kerr, and 
Medvec 1993; Shepperd, Ouellette, and Fernandez 1996). Drawing on this 
research, we refer to the opportunity to exert effort as having a potential behavior 
of relevance to a particular outcome. We prefer the term ―effort‖ over ―action‖ (a 
term commonly used in the control literature), as effort is almost always exerted 
to achieve a particular end—in our context, achieving control—while action does 
not necessarily involve a sense of purpose (according to Merriam-Webster’s 
definition). 
 
Ambiguity Seeking: A Control-based Account 
 
Despite the fact that an opportunity for effort can promote a sense of 
control, this perception of control does not always transform into greater outcome 
expectancy (Presson and Benassi 1996). In card games, for instance, having the 
opportunity to draw a card on one’s own (vs. having no such opportunity) does 
not increase the expectation of receiving a winning card (Budescu and Bruderman 
1995). In reviewing the literature on illusion of control, Presson and Benassi 
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(1996) concluded that likelihood judgment has generally produced smaller effects 
than less direct measures, such as betting amount. The same has been shown in 
the desirability-bias literature, in which likelihood judgment has produced the 
least supportive evidence for desirability effects (Krizan and Windschitl 2007). 
The weaker findings based on likelihood perception may be due to the ―sticky‖ 
nature that characterizes the precise probabilistic information commonly adopted 
in such investigations (e.g., the probability of drawing a marked card from an 
evenly split deck of marked and unmarked cards is 50%). As individuals desire to 
be accountable in their responses (Kunda 1990), it is probable that they tend to 
use the precise probability (e.g., 50%) as a firm reference in generating outcome 
expectancy with little further adjustment. We suggest that ambiguous probability 
may free individuals from such constraint by providing leeway for bias distortion 
to occur in the desired direction. In other words, perceived control in response to 
an opportunity to exert effort is more likely to yield greater outcome expectancy 
over prospects with ambiguous information. On the other hand, the absence of 
opportunity to exert effort attenuates control perception, and hence curtails the 
biased likelihood judgment toward greater outcome expectancy, which would 
otherwise be induced with ambiguous information. Taken together, we should 
observe greater ambiguity-seeking tendencies in events that offer an opportunity 
to exert effort (vs. no such opportunity). 
The control-based account is distinct from the competence-based model 
(Heath and Tversky 1991), which suggests that people tend to seek ambiguity in 
their domains of expertise; they can claim credit if they perform well and avoid 
blame if they do not. More importantly, while Heath and Tversky (1991) focused 
on objective competence (such as knowledge or expertise), we focus on 
individuals’ subjective competence that is triggered by a mere task characteristic. 
Also, rather than assume the negativity of ambiguity and treat the aversion of 
ambiguity as an internal state, we treat ambiguity as neutral and suggest that 
ambiguity avoidance or approach behavior is dependent on the motivational state 




Finally, given that individuals desire to be accountable and seek to make 
decisions that are justifiable (Kunda 1990), it may be reasonable to argue that 
preference of an ambiguous over a precise option is more justifiable when 
individuals have the opportunity to exert effort. Hence, our proposed effects may 
be explained through a justification-based perspective that centers on the desire to 
be accountable rather than through a control-based account that focuses on the 
desire to be capable. However, past research has shown that when justification 
need is heightened, individuals are more likely to avoid ambiguity, demonstrating 
that the avoidance of ambiguity is in fact more justifiable (Curley, Yates, and 
Abrams 1986). Despite the evidence suggesting the unlikely applicability of the 
justification-based alternate account, we sought to rule it out empirically in a 




Experiment 1 had two primary aims. First, it tested our predictions in an 
urn-and-marble paradigm widely used in ambiguity research. Second, as 
mentioned earlier, Mishra et al. (2008) have demonstrated, using the same 
paradigm, that individuals are more optimistic after drawing a marble from an 
ambiguous urn. Since our research focuses on the provision (vs. no provision) of 
the effort opportunity, it stands to reason that Mishra et al.’s findings—as well as 
our proposed effects—can be (re)produced within one experimental setup. Doing 
so allows us to highlight the separate but complementary theoretical and empirical 
links between the two studies.  
One hundred and eighty-seven (112 female, 75 male) undergraduates 
participated in a 2 (ambiguity in composition of marbles in the bag: precise vs. 
ambiguous) × 2 (opportunity to exert effort: experimenter-pick vs. self-pick) × 2 
(effort stage: pre vs. post) between-subjects experiment for course credit. Each 
received a bag containing blue and white marbles and was told that winning 
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would require drawing a blue marble, which would entitle them to enter a lottery 
for a cash prize.  
Participants in the precise-information condition were told that the bag 
contained 6 white and 6 blue marbles, whereas those in the ambiguous-
information condition were told that the bag contained 12 marbles, some of which 
were white and some of which were blue in an unknown proportion. Thereafter, 
participants were either told they would draw a marble from the bag on their own 
(the self-pick condition), or that the experimenter would draw a marble for them 
(the experimenter-pick condition). Participants indicated their optimism (1 = not 
at all optimistic and 7 = very optimistic) about drawing a blue (i.e., the winning 
color) marble, either before the marble was drawn (the pre-effort condition) or 
after the marble was drawn but before the outcome was known (the post-effort 
condition).  
We predicted that participants with the opportunity to draw a marble from 
the bag (vs. without such opportunity) would be relatively more optimistic about 
winning the game when the bag contained an ambiguous amount of blue/white 
marbles than when the bag contained a precise amount of blue/white marbles. 
Furthermore, this pattern should apply for both pre- and post-effort conditions. At 
the same time, given that Mishra et al. (2008) had all of their participants draw a 
marble on their own, we also expected to pick up their goal-based effect—that is, 
our participants in the self-pick condition would be more optimistic when their 




Optimism about Winning. A three-way ANOVA was performed and the 
result yielded a marginally significant three-way interaction (F (1, 179) = 2.78, p 
< .1). To test our hypothesis, we analyzed the two-way interactions between 
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ambiguity and opportunity to exert effort within the pre-effort and post-effort 
conditions.  
At both the pre- and post-effort stages, we observed statistically 
significant interactions between ambiguity and opportunity to exert effort (pre-
effort stage: F (1, 179) = 3.95, p < .05; post-effort stage: F (1, 179) = 17.89, p 
< .001). At the pre-effort stage, participants were more optimistic about winning 
the precise bet than the ambiguous bet when the marble was drawn by someone 
else (4.67 vs. 3.40; F (1, 179) = 13.80, p < .001), exhibiting the typical pattern 
analogous to ambiguity aversion. This pattern diminished, however, when 
participants drew the marble on their own (4.52 vs. 4.22; F (1, 179) = 0.77, p 
= .38; see Figure 1). Similarly, at the post-effort stage, participants were more 
optimistic about winning the precise bet than the ambiguous bet when the marble 
was drawn by someone else (4.48 vs. 3.09; F (1, 179) = 15.20, p < .001). 
However, the result pattern was reversed when participants drew the marble on 
their own; they were less optimistic about winning the precise bet than the 
ambiguous bet (4.30 vs. 5.05; F (1, 179) = 4.34, p < .05), exhibiting a pattern 
analogous to ambiguity seeking. The shift toward the direction of ―ambiguity 
seeking‖ from the pre-effort to the post-effort stage was likely due to the additive 
effect of the two goals present in the post-effort, self-pick, and ambiguous 
condition: (1) to feel good about the exerted effort (as suggested in Mishra et al. 
2008), and (2) to experience a sense of control in one’s own effort. 
In addition, we replicated Mishra et al.’s (2008) findings under the self-
pick condition. A two-way ANOVA under the self-pick condition revealed a 
statistically significant interaction between ambiguity and effort stage (F (1, 179) 
= 4.44, p < .05). Planned contrasts further showed that participants were more 
optimistic about winning after they had drawn a marble than before for the 
ambiguous bets (5.05 vs. 4.22; F (1, 179) = 5.42, p < .05), but not for the precise 
bets (4.30 vs. 4.52; F (1, 179) = 0.39, p = .53). However, when participants did 
not have the opportunity to draw a marble on their own (the experimenter-pick 
condition), a two-way ANOVA did not reveal a statistically significant interaction 
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between ambiguity and effort stage (F (1, 179) = 0.06, p = .81). Planned contrasts 
showed that participants did not display greater optimism post-effort (vs. pre-) for 
either the ambiguous bets (3.09 vs. 3.40; F (1, 179) = 0.79, p = .37) or the precise 
bets (4.48 vs. 4.67; F (1, 179) = 0.29, p = .59). These findings seem to imply that 
the post-effort, goal-based effect found by Mishra et al. is less likely to extend to 
instances when others’ efforts are involved. This is probable because while people 
desire to experience their own efforts as instrumental in producing desirable 





OPTIMISM ABOUT WINNING AS A FUNCTION OF AMBIGUITY, 



































We demonstrated in a game setting that people are relatively more 
optimistic about their chance of winning in an ambiguous situation (vs. a precise 
situation) when they have the opportunity to exert effort, compared to when they 
do not. This applies to both the pre- and post-effort stages. 
Although experiment 1 provided evidence consistent with the control-
based account, it did not directly test for ambiguity preferences, as each 
participant was only exposed to one option (either precise or ambiguous). In 
experiment 2, we adopted a joint-evaluation setup in which participants could 
choose between precise and ambiguous bets. Furthermore, we measured outcome 
expectancy more directly—through participants’ estimated chances of winning—
which allowed us to test for the mediating role of outcome expectancy in 
ambiguity preferences. In documenting the mediating role of outcome expectancy, 
we further substantiate the argument that people with the opportunity to exert 
effort may seek to capitalize on the greater uncertainty (brought up by ambiguity) 
for better outcomes. In addition, since our predictions rest on the assumption that 
opportunity to exert effort leads to perceived control, we expect the proposed 
effect would be attenuated when the assumed link between opportunity to exert 
effort and perceived control is broken. Past research has shown that low self-
efficacy is often associated with reduced perception of control (Bandura 1977; 
Thompson, Armstrong and Thomas 1998). As such, we predict that the greater 
ambiguity-seeking tendency in response to the opportunity to exert effort may be 




Experiment 2 employed a choice setup based on a modified version of the 
―urn-and-marble‖ paradigm. Instead of receiving only one type of bag with an 
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either precise or ambiguous composition of colored marbles, each participant 
received both types of bags and was asked to choose one type from which they 
would draw a marble, and indicate their relative preferences for the two types of 
bags on a scale. We expected participants with the opportunity to draw a marble 
on their own to be more likely to prefer the ambiguous bag, compared to those 
without this opportunity. Furthermore, we expected the effect to be mediated by 





Design and Procedure. The experiment had a 2 (opportunity to exert effort: 
experimenter-pick vs. self-pick) by 2 (self-efficacy: neutral vs. low) between-
subjects design. One hundred and fifteen undergraduate students (68 female, 47 
male) participated in the experiment for course credit. 
Prior research has suggested that recalling a mastery experience (failure 
experience) can effectively increase (undermine) a sense of self-efficacy (Bandura 
1977). We thus sought to lower participants’ self-efficacy with an autobiographic 
recall task (Galinsky, Gruenfeld and Magee 2003; Agrawal and Duhachek 2010). 
About half of the participants were asked to recall a recent personal failure that 
had made them feel inferior, incompetent, or even worthless (the low self-efficacy 
condition). To control the valence of their mood as equally negative, the other 
participants were asked to recall a recent failure experience that had made them 
feel bad—but which was clearly not their fault (the control condition).  
Following the event-recall task, participants were introduced to the ―urn-
and-marble‖ game, which was presented as being unrelated to the event-recall 
task. Each participant saw two types of bags, with the first type (Bag #1) 
described as containing 6 white and 6 blue marbles and the second (Bag #2) 
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described as containing 12 marbles, with both white and blue in an unknown 
proportion. Next, about half of the participants were told that they would draw a 
marble on their own from their chosen bag and the other half that the 
experimenter would draw a marble from their chosen bag for them. Participants 
then indicated from which bag they would like the marble to be drawn and their 
relative preferences for the two types of bags (on a 9-point scale, anchored by 1 = 
strongly prefer Bag #1 and 9 = strongly prefer Bag #2). A larger value indicates a 
greater preference for the bet involving an ambiguous amount of colored marbles. 
Participants were then asked about their estimated probability of receiving the 




Manipulation Check. To avoid potential demand effects from checking the 
effectiveness of the recall task in the main study, we employed a separate group 
of 44 participants from the same sampling frame. These participants received the 
same event-recall task as in the main study. Upon completion of the event recall, 
they indicated to what extent each of the following items reflected how they felt 
right now: ―incapable,‖ ―weak,‖ ―small,‖ ―sad,‖ ―upset,‖ and ―distressed,‖ all 
anchored by 1 = not at all and 5 = extremely. As expected, participants under the 
low self-efficacy condition were lower in self-efficacy (the mean of ―incapable,‖ 
―weak,‖ and ―small‖; α = 0.52) than those under the control condition (2.41 vs. 
1.88; F (1, 42) = 5.25, p < .05). The two groups did not differ, however, in general 
negative emotions (the mean of ―sad,‖ ―upset,‖ and ―distressed‖; α = 0.69; 2.92 vs. 
2.97, F (1, 42) = 0.03, p = .87).  
 
Bag Choice and Bag Preference: Ambiguity Seeking. We first analyzed 
bag choice as a function of opportunity to exert effort and efficacy level. Binary 
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logistic regression revealed a statistically significant interaction effect (Wald’s Z 
= 7.55, p < .01). Supporting our predictions, more individuals chose the 
ambiguous bag under the self-pick condition than under the experimenter-pick 
condition, but only when their personal efficacy was unchanged (43.3% vs. 17.9%; 
Wald’s Z = 4.17, p < .05; see Figure 2). The effect was greatly attenuated (and 
even reversed) when participants were induced to experience lower self-efficacy 
(25.9% vs. 50.0%; Wald’s Z = 3.38, p = .066).  
Consistent with the choice data, the same pattern was found for the 
relative preference ratings. A two-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant 
interaction between opportunity to exert effort and efficacy level (F (1, 111) = 
9.22, p < .01). As predicted, participants with the opportunity to exert effort—
compared to those without this opportunity—preferred to bet on the ambiguous 
bag as opposed to the precise bag, provided that their self-efficacy perception was 
unaffected (4.73 vs. 3.71; F (1, 111) = 3.64, p = .059). This preference was 
reversed, however, when participants’ self-efficacy was lowered (3.81 vs. 5.10; F 
(1, 111) = 5.68, p < .05).  
Although consistent with our hypothesis, the reversal of bet preference in 
the low self-efficacy (vs. normal efficacy) condition was somewhat unexpected. 
Our post-hoc interpretation is that when low self-efficacy is induced, participants 
may perceive another’s (i.e., the experimenter’s) effort as relatively more 
effective in producing the desired outcome.  
 
Estimated Winning Probability: Mediation Analysis. A two-way ANOVA 
revealed a statistically significant interaction between efficacy level and 
opportunity to exert effort on the estimated probability of drawing the winning 
color (F (1, 111) = 15.53, p < .001). Supporting our prediction, for participants 
whose self-efficacy was unaffected, the estimated probability of winning was 
higher for those with the opportunity to exert effort than for those without such 
opportunity (52.7% vs. 43.9%; F (1, 111) = 6.67, p < .05; see Figure 3). This 
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difference was reversed when participants experienced lower self-efficacy (43.0% 
vs. 53.3%; F (1, 111) = 8.92, p < .05). Furthermore, to probe the mediation role of 
estimated winning probability, we followed the bootstrap procedure for indirect 
effects (Zhao, Lynch and Chen 2010; Hayes 2012). The findings revealed that 
estimated probability of winning mediated the interaction effect that opportunity 
to exert effort and self-efficacy have on bag preference. The indirect effect of the 
interaction on bag preference was negative (-1.32), with a 95% confidence 
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Experiment 2 demonstrated the proposed outcome effect under the 
neutral-efficacy condition, in which greater opportunity to exert effort increases 
the tendency to seek ambiguity. It also provided support for the underlying 
control-based process by proving the moderating effect of self-efficacy and the 
mediating role of outcome expectancy/estimated winning probability. 
The findings under the neutral self-efficacy condition further distinguish 
our work from Mishra et al. (2008)’s article. While in Mishra et al. (2008) the 
authors argue that exerting effort triggers a desire to feel good about the 
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ambiguous prospect, in our experiment ambiguity preferences and estimated 
winning likelihood were all captured before any effort was exerted, and thus were 
not dependent upon the effort stage. It is the control perception out of the 
presence of the effort opportunity (as posited in our account) that has contributed 
to the increased ambiguity-seeking tendency. 
An alternative explanation for our findings may come from the 
justification perspective, in which choosing the ambiguous option may be seen as 
more justifiable in the self-pick condition (vs. experimenter condition). If this is 
the case, we would expect our proposed effect to be enhanced—or at least remain 
at the same level—when a greater need for justification is triggered. We collected 
more data from a follow-up study to juxtapose with the findings from experiment 
2. In the follow-up study, fifty-nine undergraduate students from the same subject 
pool as the main study were recruited, and each of the participants was assigned 
to either the self-pick or experimenter-pick condition. To manipulate opportunity 
to exert effort, participants went through the same procedure as those under the 
neutral-efficacy conditions in the main study. All participants were then induced 
to experience a need for justification. Specifically, they were told that at the end 
of the game they need to empty the bag they had chosen and count the number of 
each color of marbles (Curley et al. 1986).  
We compared the choice-incidence results with those obtained under the 
neutral-efficacy condition in the main study. In the main study, participants with 
the effort opportunity (vs. those without such opportunity) were more likely to 
choose the ambiguous bet (43.3% vs. 17.9%; Wald’s Z = 4.17, p < .05). In 
contrast, participants with a greater need for justification in the follow-up study 
did not exhibit the same ambiguity-seeking tendency (25.8% vs. 21.4%; Wald’s Z 
= 0.16, p = .69). Consistent with previous work (Curley et al. 1986), our findings 
suggest that preference for the ambiguous option is harder to justify, and hence a 






Our aim with experiment 3 was to provide further validation of our 
proposed account in a product choice context. Ninety-two participants were 
individually instructed to examine and choose between two brands of portable 
media player, and were told that they would have the chance to win a media 
player of their chosen brand in a subsequent drawing. Participants received a 
brochure containing product information for the two brands of media player. The 
information was ostensibly drawn from a local consumer-reports group and the 
product attributes (e.g., sound quality, playback time) of the two brands were 
listed side by side in bullet points for ease of comparison. The experiment had a 2 
(ambiguity in product information: precise vs. ambiguous) × 2 (opportunity to 
exert effort: experimenter-pick vs. self-pick) between-subjects design.  
Information ambiguity was manipulated via the product failure rate of one 
of the two brands (the target brand), with the failure rate of the other brand (the 
comparison brand) kept constant. In the precise-information condition, 
participants were told that different sources of consumer reports had indicated the 
failure rate of the target brand to be 18% within 1 year after the warranty period 
ended. In the ambiguous-information condition, the failure rate was described as 
ranging from 10% to 26% (Kuhn 1997; Muthukrishnan, Wathieu, and Xu 2009). 
In both the precise and ambiguous conditions, the failure rate of the comparison 
brand was always 22%. All other product attributes were calibrated such that the 
comparison brand was slightly superior to the target brand in sound and screen 
quality (rated from 1 to 5 stars), while the target brand was slightly superior in 
playback time and outlook (see Figure 4). These non-failure-rate attributes were 
pretested to ensure that, absent the failure-rate information, the two players were 
comparable. In a pretest, twenty participants recruited from the same subject pool 
examined product information (except for failure-rate information) for both the 
target and comparison brands and indicated their relative preference on a 1-to-10 
scale (a higher number indicates a stronger preference for the target brand). The 
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average preference rating of 5.15 was not significantly different from the midscale 
point (5.15 vs. 5.5; t (19) = 0.28; p = .78), suggesting indifference as to preference 
between the two brands. Other features, such as product color, screen size, 
country of origin, and warranty period, were included for realism and were 








The opportunity to exert effort was modeled according to the two forms of 
product-display setup observed in the marketplace. Before entering the lab, all 
participants were given the following instruction: ―Please imagine that you are 
strolling through a mall and thinking of buying a portable media player. You 
come upon a store specializing in electronic products, with a variety of brands 
available.‖ About half the participants were then told, ―The store has a typical 
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open-display concept, whereby a display set for each of their products is 
displayed on the shelves. You are free to pick any item from the shelves for 
further examination. Once you select a product, the shop assistant will get the 
item from storage, where additional stocks of each product are kept‖ (the 
experimenter-pick condition). The other half of the participants were told, ―The 
store has a typical open-display concept, whereby all the products are stored and 
displayed on their shelves. You can freely pick up any item from the shelves for 
further examination and pay for it at the cashier‖ (the self-pick conditions).  
After entering the lab, participants saw 10 new boxes of each brand, 
placed either in front of them (the self-pick condition), or behind the experimenter 
but within the participant’s sight (the experimenter-pick condition). After 
examining the product information listed in the brochure, participants in the self-
pick condition picked up a product item among all the media players placed in 
front of them; those in the experimenter-pick condition informed the experimenter 
of their choice and received the item randomly retrieved by the experimenter.  
All participants were then given a questionnaire on which they indicated 
their chosen brand and their relative preference between the two brands (on a 10-
point scale, from -5 = definitely prefer [name of the comparison brand] to 5 = 
definitely prefer [name of the target brand], with 0 excluded). The measure for 
preference was recoded into a 1-to-10 scale for subsequent analyses, with a larger 
value indicating a greater preference for the target brand. Participants also 
indicated the estimated failure rate of the product they had received (―Imagine 
that you indeed purchased the preferred model you have indicated. What do you 
think are the chances that the new player your have just gotten would fail within 1 
year after the warranty period?‖), with a lower value indicating a greater outcome 
expectancy. Other measures, including the importance of the product failure rate 
(―How important/relevant is the product failure rate to you when you consider 
buying a portable media player?‖), personal interest in electronic products (―How 
interested are you in electronic products in general?‖), and personal knowledge of 
portable media players (―how much do you know about portable media players?‖) 
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were collected at the end of the questionnaire (all anchored by 1 = not at all and 7 
= very much).  
We expected participants who could freely choose among similar product 
items to have a higher relative preference for the target brand that had been 
characterized with an ambiguous product failure rate (vs. one with a precise 
failure rate). Furthermore, this relative preference would be mediated by 





Confound Checks. ANOVAs with ambiguity and opportunity to exert 
effort as the independent variables were conducted on the importance of product 
failure rate, personal interest in electronic products, and personal knowledge of 
portable media players. No main or interaction effect was found for any of the 
above measures (Fs < 1), ruling them out as potential confounds. 
 
Brand Choice and Preference: Ambiguity Seeking. Binary logistic 
regression revealed a statistically significant interaction between information 
ambiguity and opportunity to exert effort in predicting the choice incidence of the 
target brand (Wald’s Z = 4.19, p < .05). In line with our expectations, participants 
were more likely to choose the target brand when its failure rate was conveyed 
ambiguously than when it was conveyed precisely under the self-pick condition 
(70.8% vs. 45.0%; Wald’s Z = 2.93, p < .1), exhibiting a tendency to seek 
ambiguity (though only marginally significant). This tendency, however, totally 
disappeared under the experimenter-pick condition (39.1% vs. 56.0%; Wald’s Z = 
1.35, p = .25; see Figure 5).  
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Consistent with the choice data, the same pattern was found for brand 
preference. A two-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant interaction 
between information ambiguity and opportunity to exert effort (F (1, 88) = 3.71, p 
= .05). Planned contrasts showed that relative preference for the target brand, as 
its failure rate was ambiguous, was greater than when it was precise under the 
self-pick condition (6.58 vs. 5.40; F (1, 88) = 2.44, p = .12), but not under the 
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Estimated Product Failure Rate: Mediation Analysis. ANOVA revealed a 
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effort on estimated product failure rate
1
 (F (1, 81) = 4.07, p < .05). For 
participants who had no opportunity to choose an item on their own, their 
estimated product failure rate was higher when the target brand was conveyed 
ambiguously than when it was conveyed precisely (25.7% vs. 19.2%; F (1, 81) = 
3.47, p < .1), although the effect only reached marginal significance. In contrast, 
for participants who had the opportunity to exert effort, the tendency to estimate 
their product failure rate as higher under the ambiguous condition (vs. precise 
condition) disappeared (18.7% vs. 22.2%; F (1, 81) = .99, p = .32; see Figure 6). 
More importantly, a bootstrap procedure for indirect effects (Zhao, Lynch and 
Chen 2010; Hayes 2012) revealed that the estimated failure-rate response was a 
statistically significant mediator of the interaction effect between opportunity to 
exert effort and ambiguity on brand preference. The indirect effect was positive 
(0.1827), with a 95% confidence interval between .0003 and .4112. 
FIGURE 6 
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 The difference in degree of freedom as compared to that for the preference measure (88) is due to 

















Experiment 3 allowed us to extend the generality of our proposed effects 
in a marketplace context. It further validated the role of outcome expectancy, as 
measured by estimated product failure rate, in mediating the effects that 
ambiguity and opportunity to exert effort jointly have on ambiguity preferences. 
In addition, as brand choice involved multi-attribute tradeoffs, the ambiguity 
feature of the brand-choice task was arguably less salient than the classic 
manipulation in Ellsberg’s (1961) classic paradigm. This adds to the method 
variability that has been employed in ambiguity research. Further, the lower level 
of precise product failure-rate information, as well as the narrower failure-rate 
range, deviated from the relatively higher probability levels and wider ambiguity 
range employed in experiments 1 and 2, thereby extending the applicability of our 




Across three experiments, we provide convergent evidence in support of 
the control-based account of ambiguity seeking. We found that whether in a 
gamble (experiments 1 & 2) or a product-choice context (experiment 3), greater 
opportunity to exert effort increases the tendency to select the more ambiguous 
option. This effect is mediated by outcome expectancies, measured via subjective 
likelihood judgment (experiments 2 and 3), and moderated by self-efficacy 
perception (experiment 2). 
Prior research has shown that ambiguity can sometimes be rewarding. For 
instance, ambiguity can enhance both the perceived and actual effectiveness of a 
product (Mishra, Mishra, and Shiv 2011) or contribute to consumer welfare and 
make people happier (Lee and Qiu 2009). To this end, our research adds to this 
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perspective by further suggesting that individuals can be ―strategic‖ to the extent 
that when circumstances are favorable (e.g., the opportunity to exert effort), they 
will seek ambiguity to achieve higher rewards in probabilistic outcomes.  
 
Opportunity to Exert Effort 
 
The moderating influence of self-efficacy, as demonstrated in experiment 
2, suggests that for an opportunity to exert effort to enhance the favorability of 
ambiguous information, it needs to be perceived as instrumental in augmenting 
outcome expectancy. Just as perceived instrumentality can differ across 
individuals, it may also differ across the efforts available. Specifically, when an 
effort does not have the capacity to influence the outcome, our control-based 
effect is unlikely to occur and, in turn, promote ambiguity-seeking tendency. This 
plausibility allows us to explain a finding from Mishra et al. (2008) that seems 
inconsistent with our framework. In their experiment (exp 3b), participants were 
asked to choose between two movies, with one movie having ambiguous ratings 
and the other precise ratings. Specifically, the ―ambiguous‖ movie had ―two 
critics giving it a rating of 5 and two critics giving it a rating of 1,‖ while the 
―precise‖ movie had ―all four critics giving it a rating of 3.‖ Individual difference 
in optimism was measured with the LOT scale (Scheier, Carver, and Bridges 
1994).  
To the extent that optimism is positively related to active coping and 
problem solving (Scheier and Carver 1985), our account would suggest that 
individuals with greater optimism are more likely to expect ambiguity to be 
resolved in their favor, and hence be more likely to choose the ―ambiguous‖ 
movie. However, optimism level was not found to influence movie choice. We 
suggest that this was so because participants may not have perceived their choice 
as being instrumental in affecting the predetermined content of the ambiguously 
rated movie. In contrast, the tasks in our experiments involved malleable 
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prospects (e.g., selection of marbles or same store-unit products) that offered the 
possibility of attaining better outcomes. In sum, our account does not generalize 
to all opportunities, and is more applicable to instances in which perceived 
instrumentality of the effort is unhampered. This is also one reason why ―effort‖ 
rather than ―action‖ (which includes making choices) is a more suitable term for 
our framework. 
Although our experiments employed effort opportunities in the form of 
physical efforts (e.g., drawing a marble), we suggest that our account may be also 
applicable to thought efforts, as long as perceived instrumentality is present. For 
instance, past research has shown that giving more thought to a situation creates 
an illusion of control (Langer 1975), and people may practice magical thinking to 
satisfy their motivational need for control (Pronin et al. 2006). Given this, it is 
possible that we may observe similar effects with ambiguous events that provide 
the opportunity to exert thought efforts. For instance, an event whose outcome 
would be revealed at a later time could potentially allow more opportunities for 
individuals to contemplate the desired outcome (Langer 1975). In that case, our 
account would suggest that offering more time to decide between ambiguous and 
precise options could also encourage ambiguity-seeking tendencies. 
In our experiments, participants were given the opportunity to exert their 
own effort or not. It is unclear how the level of information ambiguity would 
affect choice between the effort and no-effort opportunities. Would people prefer 
the effort (vs. no-effort) opportunity more when outcome information is 
ambiguous? For example, would investors prefer to make decisions about stocks 
on their own or seek professional recommendations for listings that are relatively 
new (and thus with more ambiguity regarding future performance)? Our findings 
suggest that the self-effort opportunity would appear more attractive when stocks 
of new firms (vs. established firms) are being evaluated. In relations, the extent to 
which our findings apply to other forms of ambiguity (e.g., availability of 
information [Heath and Tversky 1991], compatibility of available information 
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[Slovic and MacPhillamy 1974], and vividness of information [Muthu 1995]) also 
awaits further investigation.  
In the present research, we focus on responses to information ambiguity 
before the event outcome is revealed. It may also be interesting for future research 
to examine the post-outcome effects of ambiguity-seeking behavior. For instance, 
will individuals who have played an ambiguous game of chance and lost realize 
the illusory nature of their judgment, and cease playing thereafter? Or will they 
justify the loss more easily, since ambiguity also provides the grounds for 
dissonance reduction? Past research has shown that being able to predict when an 
event (even a failure) will occur can increase one’s sense of control (Thompson et 
al. 1998). As such, gamblers who have lost a game may retrospectively construe 
their loss as having been foreseen (and thus they may feel they are still in control), 
and ambiguity can facilitate this reconstruction process. Understanding the role of 
ambiguity at the post-outcome stage may help policy makers better understand, 
for instance, the factors that shape people’s addiction to gambling. Along these 
same lines, our findings may offer another reason why people are so attracted to 
slot machines, which are the largest revenue source for casinos. The ambiguous 
payout structure (i.e., a wide range of payout rates) and a decent pull of the handle, 
which represents an opportunity to exert effort, seem conducive to producing a 











Guilt, as a negative self-conscious emotion, can be experienced when 
people violate personal standards or social norms (Devine and Monteith 1993; 
Higgins 1987; Tangney 1992). Depending on whether the violation involved 
another person or oneself, guilt can be broadly categorized as either interpersonal 
(e.g., for having harmed another) or intrapersonal (e.g., for having harmed 
oneself). In this paper, we focus on intrapersonal guilt, as it is often experienced 
after self-control failure (e.g., feeling guilty after impulsive spending), and thus of 
great relevance to consumers (Dahl, Honea, and Manchanda 2003). In particular, 
we investigate how intrapersonal guilt affects people’s choice of hedonic 
experience in seemingly unrelated domains (e.g., watching a sad movie vs. happy 
movie).  
Empirical evidence on interpersonal guilt shows that guilt may lead to a 
greater tendency to forgo pleasure and even to seek pain (Bastian, Jetten, and 
Fasoli 2011; Inbar et al. 2013; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009; Wallington 1973). 
These findings have been explained as a means of feeling better: People use one 
kind of negative experience (e.g., physical pain) to get rid of another (e.g., 
psychological pain). This explanation is counterintuitive, since, as the well-
documented literature on mood repair would suggest, the person could have 
sought pleasure rather than another painful experience to reduce the feelings of 
guilt. In addition, it is not empirically clear whether the same behavioral tendency 




We investigate the effect of guilt on hedonic experience-seeking from a 
goal-regulation perspective. We argue that guilt would call for action to ensure 
goal-consistent behavior in the future. In other words, guilt involves the sense of 
being self-accountable for the negative behavior, and would prompt acting to 
ensure that one would behave goal-consistently in the future. Negative experience 
(either by forgoing pleasure or voluntarily seeking pain), we argue, would be 
sought as a self-correcting measure to prevent future goal-inconsistent behavior.  
We conducted five experiments to test our proposition that voluntarily 
seeking negative experience is driven by the goal people failed to attain due to 
their own fault. Specifically, we show that, compared to negative but non-guilt 
emotions, guilt is more likely to lead people to seek negative experience in the 
following situations: (1) when they believe that enduring negative experience is 
instrumental for achieving goals (experiments 1A and 1B), (2) when they want to 
persist with a failed goal (experiment 2), or (3) when they believe their personal 
qualities are changeable—and therefore potentially correctable—over time 
(experiments 3 and 4). All the experiments, taken together, support a goal-
regulation explanation of why people seek negative experience when they feel 
guilty.  
Our study contributes to the literature on self-conscious emotions by 
testing the goal-regulation mechanism that underlies the seemingly irrational 
behavior of seeking negative experience in response to guilt. It also adds to the 
growing body of work documenting the goal-regulation role of counter-hedonistic 




Consumers frequently experience guilt or similar emotions, such as regret 
and shame, when they fail to live up to important personal values or personal 
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―oughts‖—that is, standards they believe they should abide by (Devine and 
Monteith 1993; Higgins 1987; Scherer, 1984; Tangney 1992). Such values or 
―oughts‖ may include being socially responsible; prudent with money; or, as a 
student, academically successful. 
Past research has documented the differences between guilt and other 
closely related negative self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame and regret) in terms 
of their appraisal antecedents (Berndsen et al. 2004; Lewis 1993; Roseman 1991; 
Weiner 1985) and action tendencies (Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman 2010). For 
instance, it has been shown that guilt is more likely to be felt if one focuses more 
on one’s misconduct, whereas shame is more likely to be experienced when the 
focus is on the self. Despite such distinctions, however, these kinds of emotions 
are often experienced simultaneously and have been used interchangeably 
(Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ramanathan 2008; Passyn and Sujan 2006; 
Tangney 1992). For this study, we follow the latter line of practice and use the 
term ―guilt‖ to refer to a set of negative self-conscious emotions (such as guilt, 
shame, and regret), which other researchers have also termed ―moral emotions‖ or 
―self-accountable emotions.‖ Rather than examine the differences among these 
emotions, here we focus on the similar consequences these kinds of emotions 
provoke in intrapersonal settings. We are interested in understanding how a 
person who is feeling guilty (e.g., after shopping impulsively or gaming the night 
before an important exam) will react to unrelated hedonic consumption 
opportunities.   
 
Interpersonal Guilt and the Tendency to Seek Negative Experience 
 
Past research on interpersonal guilt has shown that guilt can lead to a 
greater tendency to avoid pleasure and even to seek pain (i.e., self-punishment 
behavior; Bastian et al. 2011; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009; Wallington 1973). 
For instance, Wallington (1973) found that participants who had cheated in an 
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earlier task would impose higher intensities of electric shock to themselves in a 
later task. More recently, Bastian et al. (2011) demonstrate that compared to 
participants who were told to recall a daily routine, participants who were directed 
to recall a past experience in which they had socially excluded someone kept their 
hands in icy water (i.e., underwent a negative experience) for a longer period. In 
this and similar studies, seeking negative experience has been explained as a way 
to relieve guilt. The experiments were conducted in interpersonal settings, and it 
has been suggested that seeking negative experience can restore the moral balance 
by compensating for the pain inflicted on others (Lindsay-Hartz, De Rivera, and 
Mascolo 1995).  
Following the same logic, in the intrapersonal setting, a person who feels 
guilty after self-regulation failure might engage in other negative experience in 
order to feel better. However, to relieve a negative emotion by undergoing another 
negative experience seems to contradict the hedonistic principle (Freud 
1920/2003), which states that people will try to maximize their pleasure and 
minimize pain. If people simply want to feel better, it is not clear why they would 
not seek hedonically pleasant consumption to repair the negative emotional state, 
as a vast literature on mood repair has suggested (Gendolla 2000; Higgins 1997; 
Larsen 2000).   
 
One Function of Guilt: Goal Regulation 
 
Prior research has associated negative self-conscious emotions with the 
function of promoting goal-consistent behavior (Giner-Sorolla 2001; Kochanska 
et al. 2009; Passyn and Sujan 2006; Roseman, Wiest and Swartz 1994). Guilt is a 
painful experience people try to avoid, and once it has become strongly associated 
with a certain behavior, it would serve as an effective tool to prevent the behavior 
from reoccurring. For instance, Giner-Sorolla (2001) has found that the stronger 
the anticipated guilt over giving in to a temptation, the more effectively an 
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individual will resist the temptation. Guilt can also activate an intention to correct 
the wrongdoing while it is being felt (Baumeister Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994). 
For instance, in an interpersonal setting, feeling guilty might prompt the offender 
to apologize and attempt to compensate for the harm done to another.  
 
Our Hypothesis: Seeking Negative Experience to Deter Future Transgression 
 
Based on this well-documented function of guilt, we expect that in the 
intrapersonal setting the same ―correcting‖ motive would be activated. That is, 
feeling guilty could make people more likely to engage in self-correcting behavior 
to ensure that in the future, they would act in a goal-consistent manner. We 
propose that such a motive to ―make things right‖ can override the motive to 
simply feel better and, in turn, influence the preference for hedonic experience in 
general. Specifically, guilt can lead to a general tendency to seek pain and avoid 
pleasure as a way to ensure goal-consistent behavior in the future.   
Our argument is drawn from research that has demonstrated that other 
than merely considering the immediate hedonic implications of their behavior, 
people also engage in hedonic consumption to maximize their performance in 
upcoming tasks (Erber and Erber 2000; Erber, Wegner, and Therriault 1996; 
Martin 2000; Martin and Davies 1998; Tamir 2005). For instance, to be calm and 
composed for an upcoming social-interaction task, people may deliberately 
choose to read a negative (vs. positive) news article before performing the task 
(Erber et al. 1996). In this case, the choice of the negative news article is 
suggested to be driven by the motivational consequence, rather than the hedonic 
consequence (Martin 2000).  
Therefore, rather than solely for its mood-lifting properties, hedonic 
experience could also be judged based on how compatible it is with the self-
correction intention that has been heightened by the feeling of guilt. Enduring 
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pain (or forgoing pleasure) could be regarded as a generic way to correct the 
wrong and to ensure goal-consistent behavior in the future. The association 
between pain and acting goal-consistently can arise from negative reinforcement 
people received from others (e.g., parents and teachers) earlier in their lives. In 
addition, across cultures, having fun and being successful seem to be in conflict 
with each other, and people believe that ―no pain, no gain.‖ In a pre-test 
conducted, we validated such an association between enduring pain and goal 
success. On a scale varying from -3 = strongly disagree to 3 = strongly agree, out 
of the 94 participants, 21% slightly agreed, 45% agreed, and 29% strongly agreed 
that one would more likely be successful if he/she could endure pain.  
Our primary aim for the study was to show that negative experience could 
also be sought as a way to regulate one’s behavior to ensure goal-consistent 
behavior in the future. To do so, we test several moderators that shed light on the 
contexts in which people would seek negative experience when they are feeling 
guilty. These moderators, taken together, support the goal-regulation explanation 
we propose.  
First, and most intuitively, if seeking negative experience is a goal-
regulation method, we expect that the individual’s beliefs regarding the 
instrumentality of voluntarily seeking negative experience to goal success would 
moderate the effect. Specifically, we hypothesize: 
H1:   When experiencing the feeling of guilt, people who believe that 
enduring negative experience facilitates goal achievement would be 
more likely to forgo pleasure and seek pain.  
Second, if negative experience is sought to ensure future goal-consistent 
behavior, we predict that goal persistence would moderate the tendency to seek 
negative experience in response to guilt. To illustrate, after breaking one’s diet, 
some people might decide to give up the goal, while others might decide to persist. 
We argue that guilt would only make people who are persistent in pursuing the 
goal forgo pleasure and seek pain. It is hypothesized that:  
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H2:   When experiencing the feeling of guilt, those who are more persistent 
with the violated goal would be more likely to seek negative 
experience. 
Last, past research on lay beliefs about self-concepts has shown that 
people can vary based, in part, on whether they believe that personal qualities can 
change or not (Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck 1998). Researchers have found that 
some people hold a relatively more fixed view of self-concepts, and do not 
believe that personal qualities would change much over time. As guilt signals that 
people attribute a goal-inconsistent behavior to self, we argue that whether or not 
people believe they can change in the future also affects the likelihood that they 
will do something to ensure that they will behave differently from the past. For 
those who believe personal qualities are fixed, they would be less likely to 
perceive that self-correcting behavior will change how they behave in the future. 
Therefore, they will be less likely to seek negative experience when they are 
feeling guilty. Based on the above argument, we predict: 
H3:   When experiencing guilt, those who hold a more dynamic view of 
their self-concepts would be more likely to seek negative experience, 
compared to those who hold a more fixed view.  
 
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS 
 
Five lab experiments were conducted to test our hypotheses. In all of the 
experiments, we used event-recall methods to manipulate guilt and its 
corresponding negative, but not self-conscious, emotions (Agrawal and Duhachek 
2010; Mukhopadhyay, Sengupta, and Ramanathan 2008). Different from prior 
research, which simply asked people to recall an event that made them feel guilty, 
we asked participants to describe an event in which they had behaved 
inconsistently with one of two specific goals: academic excellence (experiments 
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1A and 1B) and being prudent in spending money (experiments 2-4). These goals 
were highly relevant to our participants (university students). In addition, we 
varied one antecedent factor to manipulate guilt versus negative but non-guilt 
emotions, that is, whether the self had been responsible for the goal-inconsistent 
behavior. Based on prior research, a self-responsible goal-violation behavior will 
lead to guilt (Devine and Monteith 1993; Higgins 1987; Scherer, 1984; Tangney 
1992), while a goal-inconsistent behavior for which the person did not feel 
personally responsible would lead to other negative but non-guilt emotions such 




Experiment 1A was conducted to test hypothesis 1. We predict that 
participants who believe in the instrumentality of enduring in pains are more 
likely to seek negative experience when experiencing guilt.  
 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
One hundred and forty-four (82 female, 62 male) participants from a large 
university in Asia were recruited and compensated with course credit. Upon 
arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of two emotion conditions 
(guilt vs. negative but non-guilt emotions). Participants were informed that a local 
research center on emotions was interested in consumers’ recollections of 
emotional events in their daily lives. Those under the guilt (no-guilt) manipulation 
conditions were asked to recall, in writing, an experience in which they had failed 
an important academic goal due (not due) to their own fault. As a manipulation 
check, participants then indicated how guilty, regretful, shamed, unhappy, and 
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upset the recalled event made them feel as they wrote about it, all anchored by 1 = 
not at all and 7 = very much.  
After handing in their event-recall task, all participants received a second 
survey under the cover story of ―understanding consumer preferences pertaining 
to free gifts.‖ In this task, two choice scenarios assessed participants’ tendency to 
forgo pleasant consumption experiences. In the first scenario, participants were 
asked to indicate how likely they would be to accept an invitation from their best 
friend to watch, for free, a concert by a famous pop singer they liked very much. 
The second choice asked participants to indicate how likely they would be to 
forgo a free dinning coupon at a five-star restaurant. Both of the scenarios were 
anchored by 1 = very unlikely and 7 = very likely. 
After a 5-min filler task, we used three items to assess individual beliefs 
regarding whether voluntarily forgoing pleasure or experiencing pain (i.e., self-
punishment) would increase one’s likelihood of achieving a goal. Participants 
indicated to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statements, 
all anchored by 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree: (1) Self-punishment 
for one’s goal failure makes one remember the failed goal better; (2) Punishment 
for one’s goal failure gets one closer to the goal; and (3) Those people who punish 
themselves for failures are more likely to succeed (Cronbach’s α = 0.78). Scores 




Manipulation Check. Respondents who recalled an academic failure for 
which they had been responsible were guiltier (mean of guilt, shame, and regret; α 
= 0.82; M = 4.37) than were those who recalled the same kind of failure for which 
they were not responsible (M = 3.09; F (1, 142) = 27.79, p < .001). The two 
groups, however, did not differ in general negative emotions (mean of unhappy 
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and upset; 4.20 vs. 4.15 for guilt and no-guilt conditions, respectively; F (1, 142) 
= 0.05, p = 83). Therefore, our manipulation of guilt and the equally negative but 
non-guilt emotions was successful. 
 
Tendency to Forgo Pleasant Experience. The answer to the first scenario 
(tendency to forgo a free concert ticket) was reversely coded to be consistent with 
the answer to the second scenario (tendency to forgo a dining coupon). An 
ANOVA for repeated measures, with emotion and instrumentality belief as 
between-subjects variables and the scenarios as within-subject variables, did not 
yield any interactive effect between the scenarios and any between-subject 
variables (ps > .90). The answers to the two choice scenarios were thus averaged 
to create an index of the tendency to forgo pleasure. A higher number indicated a 
greater tendency to forgo pleasure.  
A regression on the tendency to forgo pleasure with emotion, 
instrumentality belief and their interaction term as the independent variables 
revealed a statistically significant main effect of guilt (b = - 0.86, t (140) = -2.02, 
p < .05) and a statistically significant interactive effect between emotion and 
instrumentality belief (b = 0.32, t (140) = 2.86, p < .01). Slope analyses were 
conducted to further understand the interaction. For participants who experienced 
guilt (for academic goal failure for which they were responsible), those high in 
instrumentality belief (1 SD above the mean) were more likely to forgo the 
pleasant experience (M = 3.77) than were those low in instrumentality belief (1 
SD below the mean; M = 3.08; β = 0.51, t (140) = 3.33, p = .001).  
For those who experienced negative but non-guilt emotions (for academic 
failure for which they were not responsible), however, this difference disappeared 
(3.06 vs. 3.23 for high and low instrumentality belief conditions, respectively; β = 
-0.12, t (140) = -0.79, p = .433). Comparisons between emotion conditions 
showed that for participants who scored high in instrumentality belief, those who 
experienced guilt were more likely to forgo pleasure (M = 3.77) than were those 
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who experienced no guilt (M = 3.06; β = 0.71, t (140) = 3.37, p < .01). Such 
difference, however, disappeared when participants were low in instrumentality 
belief (3.08 vs. 3.23 for guilt and no-guilt conditions, respectively; β = -0.15, t 
(140) = -0.69, p = .49). Figure 7 depicts the tendency to forgo pleasant experience 
as a function of guilt manipulation and instrumentality belief measure. 
 
FIGURE 7 
TENDENCY TO FORGO PLEASURE AS A FUNCTION OF 





In experiment 1A, we showed that guilt made people forgo experience 
only when they believed that this sort of self-punishment behavior could help to 
ensure goal-consistent behavior. However, the hedonic experience involved in the 
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Since achieving excellent grades requires more study time, both watching a 
concert and dining out could be regarded as directly conflicting with the academic 
goal rather than being irrelevant. Thus, in experiment 1B, we addressed this 
concern with the dependent variable by asking people to choose penalty points for 




Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
Participants and Procedure. A total of 93 (65 female, 28 male) 
undergraduate students participated for course credit. Emotions were manipulated 
in the same way as in experiment 1A. After the event-recall task, participants 
were told that the second task was a game which would test the accuracy of their 
intuitions. In this game, participants would guess whether the result of a die roll 
was an even or odd number. The game would be repeated 10 times. Participants 
would begin with 100 points, and before they started the game, they would be 
required to self-impose penalty points on themselves for each wrong guess. We 
emphasized that the points remaining in their accounts at the end of the game 
could be exchanged for tickets (20 points for 1 ticket) for a cash-prize lottery. The 
amount of self-allocated penalty points was used to measure their tendency to 
avoid potential rewards (Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009). 
After several filler tasks, participants’ lay beliefs regarding the 
instrumentality of negative experience was measured. The same three items used 
in experiment 1A were averaged (α = .83) to form a belief index for later analysis. 
Finally, participants indicated how guilty, shamed, regretful, upset, and unhappy 
the recalled event made them feel as they wrote about it (1 = not at all and 7 = 





Manipulation Check. Manipulation of guilt was successful. Guilt (the 
mean of guilt, shame and regret; α = 0.79) was higher for respondents in the guilt 
condition (M = 4.28) than for those in the no-guilt condition (M = 3.40; F (1, 91) 
= 15.18, p < .001). The two groups did not differ in general negative emotions 
(mean of unhappy and upset; α = 0.90; 4.27 vs. 4.05 for guilt and no-guilt 
conditions, respectively; F (1, 91) = 0.75, p = .39).  
 
Tendency to Forgo Pleasure: Self-allocated Penalty Points. Regression 
analysis with emotion, instrumentality beliefs, and their interaction term as the 
independent variables showed only a statistically significant interaction (b = 0.75, 
t (89) = 2.17, p < .05). Slope analysis was conducted to further understand the 
interaction. Supporting the goal-regulation view and consistent with our findings 
in experiment 1A, for participants who recalled a guilt-provoking event, those 
with high instrumentality belief (1 SD above the mean) allocated more penalty 
points to themselves (M = 3.48) than did those with low instrumentality belief (1 
SD below the mean, M = 1.68; β = 0.97; t (89) = 3.06, p < .01). This difference 
disappeared for participants who experienced negative but non-guilt emotions 
(1.90 vs. 1.93 for high and low instrumentality belief conditions, respectively; β = 
-0.01, t (89) = -0.04, p = .97). Different directions of comparisons showed that for 
participants high in instrumentality belief, those who experienced guilt allocated 
more penalty points to themselves (M = 3.48) than did those experiencing 
negative but non-guilt emotions (M = 1.90; β = 1.58, t (89) = 2.65, p < .01). This 
difference, however, disappeared when participants were low in instrumentality 
belief (1.68 vs. 1.93 for guilt and no-guilt conditions, respectively; β = -0.25, t (89) 
= -0.42, p = .68). Figure 8 depicts the tendency to forgo pleasure (i.e., amount of 






SELF-ALLOCATED PENALTY POINTS AS A FUNCTION OF 






The first two experiments demonstrated that the more strongly an 
individual believes that negative experience can serve as a means of achieving 
goals, the more likely they would be to do so. Further, the difference 
demonstrated between the two emotional conditions indicates that seeking 
negative experience is a self-correction method for goal regulation, rather than a 
general coping method when people are experiencing negative emotions.  
In the next experiment, to show that negative experience can be sought as 
a means of goal-regulation, we manipulated the level of persistence with the 
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failed goal. As hypothesis 2 predicts, guilt would make participants who are 




Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
One hundred and six (50 female, 56 male) undergraduates took part in this 
study for course credit. The experiment employed a 2 (persistence: prime vs. no 
prime) × 2 (emotion: guilt vs. negative but non-guilt emotions) between-subjects 
design. Different from experiment 1, participants first completed a survey with 
the purpose of manipulating how persistent they are with unachieved goals. This 
purpose was disguised to the participants, who were told that the survey was 
conducted simply to ―clear their thoughts before the tasks start.‖ In the survey, 
participants completed 6 sentence-unscrambling tasks. In each task, participants 
saw 5 words and were asked to form a grammatically correct sentence using 4 out 
of the 5 words (Fishbach and Labroo 2007). In the persistence-priming condition, 
sentences such as ―Persistence is a virtue‖ and ―Setbacks don’t discourage me‖ 
were included. In the control condition, sentences such as ―The ball is blue‖ and 
―She wears a jacket‖ were generated. 
After the priming task, participants completed an event-recall task similar 
to those used in experiment 1A and 1B to manipulate guilt versus other negative 
emotions. Rather than academic goal failure, guilt was evoked through the 
violation of a moral code regarding spending money. Specifically, about half of 
the participants were asked to recall an experience in which they had not spent 
money prudently and felt responsible for the misdeed (the guilt condition), while 
the rest of the participants recalled such a misdeed for which they had not been 
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responsible (the no-guilt condition). All participants then described as vividly as 
they could, in writing, how the event had made them feel.  
After participants handed in the survey on event recall, they entered into 
the second task, which was entitled ―reading comprehension‖ and conducted 
online. The cover story for the task was that ―researchers wanted to know how 
well people could relate to and be emotionally affected by reading a verbally 
described event.‖ Participants needed to choose one of two news articles to read 
and then answer a few questions. They made the choice based on the two articles’ 
titles. One was ―How to take a truly relaxing and enjoyable vacation‖ (the 
hedonically pleasant article) and the other was about ―A baby who died because 
of child abuse‖ (the hedonically unpleasant article). The corresponding article 
would appear after participants made the choice. After participants had read the 
chosen article, they indicated how the article made them feel by responding to 
these emotion items: ―Sad,‖ ―Angry,‖ ―Depressed,‖ ―Happy,‖ ―Excited,‖ and 
―Joyful‖ on 7-point scales (anchored by 1 = not at all and 7 = very much so). 
These items served as a way to check whether the articles were indeed making 
people feel the way we predicted they would. Choice of the unpleasant article 
would serve as a proxy of a greater tendency to seek negative experience (Erber, 




Manipulation Check. To check whether manipulation of guilt was 
successful, we recruited 67 participants from the same subject pool and 
manipulated emotions (guilt vs. negative but non-guilt emotions) with the same 
recall task as in the main study. Participants then indicated how guilty, regretful, 
shamed, unhappy, and upset they felt at the moment (anchored by 1 = not at all 
and 7 = very much). As expected, participants in the guilt condition felt guiltier 
(mean of guilt, shame, and regret; α = 0.84; M = 3.91) compared to those in the 
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no-guilt condition (M = 2.81; F (1, 65) = 9.89, p < .01). The two groups did not 
differ in general negative emotions (mean of unhappy and upset; α = 0.63; 3.51 vs. 
3.03 for guilt and no-guilt conditions, respectively; F (1, 65) = 1.67, p = .20).  
The two articles indeed differed in their immediate emotional impact. The 
unpleasant article made the readers felt more emotions such as ―Sad,‖ ―Angry,‖ 
and ―Depressed‖ and less ―Happy,‖ ―Excited,‖ and ―Joyful‖ compared to the 
pleasant article (ps < .001). 
 
Seeking Negative Experience: Choice of Unpleasant Article. Binary 
logistic regression with persistence prime and guilt manipulation as the 
independent variables revealed a marginally significant interactive effect (Wald’s 
Z = 3.13, p < .1). Supporting our hypothesis and consistent with our findings in 
experiments 1A and 1B, for participants who had experienced guilt, those primed 
with goal persistence were more likely to choose the unpleasant article (M = 
63.0%) than were those with no such prime (M = 34.6%; Wald’s Z = 4.14, p 
< .05). This difference, however, disappeared when participants experienced no 
guilt (30.8% vs. 37.0% for persistence prime and no-prime conditions, 
respectively; Wald’s Z = 0.23, p = .63). Different directions of comparisons 
showed that, when primed with goal persistence, participants in the guilt 
condition were more likely to choose the unpleasant article (M = 63.0%) than 
were those in the no-guilt condition (M = 30.8%; Wald’s Z = 5.30, p < .05). This 
difference, however, disappeared when participants were not primed with goal 
persistence (34.6% vs. 37.0% for guilt and no-guilt conditions, respectively; 
Wald’s Z = 0.03, p = .85). Figure 9 depicts the percentage of choice of the 








CHOICE OF THE UNPLEASANT ARTICLE AS A FUNCTION OF GOAL 





Experiment 2, by manipulating the level of being persistent, provides 
further evidence that guilty people may seek negative experience as a way to 
regulate one’s future behavior in regard to the goal. Different from other kinds of 
negative emotions resulting from failing a goal, guilt involves the attribution of 
the goal-inconsistent behavior to self. For instance, feeling guilty after breaking a 
diet could involve inferring that the individual is bad at persisting with the dieting 
goal (Bem 1972). Prior research has also shown that people differ in terms of their 
implicit beliefs about whether one’s qualities can change or not (Levy, Stroessner, 
and Dweck 1998). Past research suggests that those who hold different beliefs can 
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increased exertion of effort (to prevent failure) when the threatened quality (e.g., 
ability to achieve a goal) is perceived as changeable. Failure would lead to 
passivity, however, if individuals believed that the quality could not be improved 
(Dweck 1991). Therefore, we argue that when feeling guilty, those who believe 
that their personal qualities can change, compared to those who believe their 
personal qualities are fixed, would be more likely to seek negative experience. 
This prediction was tested in the next two experiments. Experiment 3 measured 
people’s beliefs regarding whether personal qualities are fixed or malleable, and 




Experimental Design and Procedure 
 
Ninety-nine (55 female, 42 male, 2 unreported) undergraduate students 
participated in this study for course credit. The study was conducted on two 
consecutive days. On the first day, individual views regarding the malleability of 
personal qualities were assessed using the Implicit Personality Theory Measure 
(Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck 1998). Participants responded to eight items (e.g., 
―Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change their basic 
characteristics‖) on a scale anchored by 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree. Responses (α = .92) were then averaged to create a combined measure of 
malleability beliefs, with larger values indicating greater incremental belief. 
On the second day, participants were given the same emotion-
manipulation task as in experiment 2. To reiterate, they recalled an experience in 
which they had not spent money prudently, either due to their own responsibility 
(the guilt condition) or not due to their own responsibility (the no-guilt condition). 
To assess the tendency to seek negative experience, participants received the same 
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task (choosing between two news articles to read) as in experiment 2. To check 
how the article made people feel, participants responded to the following emotion 
items: ―Sad,‖ ―Angry,‖ ―Depressed,‖ ―Happy,‖ ―Excited,‖ and ―Joyful‖ on 7-




Manipulation Check. As in experiment 2, the two articles indeed differed 
in their immediate emotional impact, with the unpleasant article making 
participants feel more ―Sad,‖ ―Angry,‖ and ―Depressed‖ and less ―Happy,‖ 
―Excited,‖ and ―Joyful‖ than the pleasant article (ps < .001).  
 
Seeking Negative Experience: Choice of Unpleasant Article. Binary 
logistic regression with guilt manipulation, malleability beliefs, and their 
interaction term as the independent variables revealed a marginally significant 
interaction (Wald’s Z = 3.33, p = .068). To better understand the interaction, 
respondents were categorized as either incremental believers or entity believers 
based on a median-split (median = 3.25) of malleability beliefs. As predicted, 
when participants experienced guilt, those categorized as incremental believers 
were more likely to choose the unpleasant article (M = 68%) than were those 
categorized as entity believers (M = 40%; Wald’s Z = 3.83, p = .05). This 
difference, however, disappeared when participants experienced no-guilt (29.2% 
vs. 48% for incremental and entity believers, respectively; Wald’s Z = 1.80, 
p > .1). Different directions of comparison revealed that for incremental believers, 
those experiencing guilt were more likely to choose the unpleasant article (M = 
68%) than those experiencing no guilt (M = 29.2%; Wald’s Z = 6.99, p < .05). 
This difference between emotion conditions, however, disappeared for entity 
believers (40% vs. 48% for guilt and no-guilt conditions, respectively; Wald’s Z = 
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0.32, p > .1). Figure 10 depicts the percentage of choice of the unpleasant article 




CHOICE OF THE UNPLEASANT ARTICLE AS A FUNCTION OF 





Experiment 3 shows that whether people would resort to negative 
experience for future goal pursuit would depend on whether they believe self-
qualities can change. If they believe that self-qualities are fixed (or cannot be 
corrected), they would not seek negative experience, as would those who were not 
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Our first three experiments relied on forgoing pleasure (e.g., jeopardizing 
one’s chance to win a lottery in experiment 1B and not choosing the pleasant 
article in experiments 2 and 3). However, seeking negative experience entails 
both forgoing pleasure and seeking pain. Experiment 4, therefore, measured how 
long people would voluntarily expose themselves to a negative physical 
experience. Specifically, participants were asked to listen to noise. Additionally, 




One hundred and fifty-nine (99 female, 60 male) undergraduate students 
participated in the study and were compensated with money (10 dollars). The 
study has a 2 (malleability beliefs: incremental vs. entity) × 2 (guilt manipulation: 
guilt vs. negative but non-guilt emotions) between-subjects design. First, 
malleability beliefs were primed with a reading-comprehension task (Chiu, Hong, 
and Dweck 1997). Specifically, about half the participants read an article claiming 
that ―Personality is changeable and can be developed‖ (the incremental-belief 
condition); the other half of the participants read an article claiming that 
―Personality, like plaster, is pretty stable over time‖ (the entity-belief condition). 
After reading their chosen article, participants wrote about a personal experience 
that was consistent with the theme of the article. 
Next, emotion (guilt vs. no-guilt) was manipulated in the same way as in 
experiments 2 and 3 (i.e., by recalling an experience in which they had not spent 
money prudently, either due to their own fault or not). To assess the tendency to 
seek negative experience, participants then received an ostensibly unrelated task, 
with the cover story that ―People differ in their reactions to negative sensory 
stimulations, be it temperature, light, scent, or sound. In this study, we want to 
know how individuals react to noises at moderate levels. By collecting the data, 
we will be able to understand individual variances with similar stimuli in a 
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shopping environment.‖ Participants were told that they could listen to the noise 
by pressing and holding a ―Play‖ button and stop the noise by releasing the button. 
They were then asked to listen to the noise for as long as they were willing to. We 
believed that duration of listening to the noise would serve as an index of 




Seeking Negative Experience: Listening to Noise. Among 159 data points 
from all participants, one outlier which was 5SD away from the global mean was 
deleted.  Key to our hypothesis 3, a 2-way ANOVA with the seconds people 
listening to the noise as the dependent variable, and guilt manipulation and 
malleability of self-view as the independent variables revealed a significant 
interaction effect (F (1, 154) = 5.96, p < .05). To further understand the 
interaction, we conducted planned contrasts. Consistent with our findings from 
experiment 3 and supporting our predictions, when experiencing guilt, 
participants primed with incremental belief listened to the noise longer 
(Mincremental-guilt = 9.23, SD = 9.62) than those primed with entity belief (Mentity-guilt 
= 3.80, SD = 4.72; F (1, 154) = 16, p < .001). When participants experienced 
negative but non-guilt emotions, the difference between malleability beliefs 
conditions disappeared (Mincremental-nonguilt = 4.21, SD = 4.74 vs. Mentity-nonguilt = 3.40, 
SD = 2.85; F (1, 154) = 0.36, p = .55). Comparisons between emotion conditions 
showed that, when primed with incremental belief, participants experiencing guilt 
listened to the noise longer (M = 9.23) than those experiencing no guilt (M = 4.21; 
F (1, 154) = 14, p < .001). This difference, however, became non-significant 
when participants were primed with entity belief (3.80 vs. 3.40 for guilt and no-
guilt conditions, respectively; F (1, 154) = 0.88, p = .77). Figure 11 depicts the 







DURATION OF LISTENINIG TO NOISE AS A FUNCTION OF 





Consumer research has long been interested in understanding consumers’ 
hedonic-seeking tendencies. Previous efforts have largely been focused on the 
implications of hedonic experience on affect regulation. For instance, research on 
mood repair has generally assumed that people will seek pleasant experience 
when feeling bad as a way to feel better (Gendolla 2000; Higgins 1997; Larsen 
2000; Shen and Wyer 2008). However, researchers have found that when people 
are feeling guilty, they may voluntarily seek more negative experience. This 
tendency has also been explained as a way to get rid of the negative feeling and 
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 Our study restores emotions such as guilt to a control process (Carver and 
Scheier 1990) and understands the motive behind seeking negative experience 
from a goal-regulation perspective. Across 5 experiments, we found converging 
evidence that when people are feeling guilty, negative experience may be sought 
voluntarily as a means to correct oneself to ensure future goal-consistent behavior. 
In experiments 1A and 1B, we found that when feeling guilty, participants were 
more likely to forgo the pleasant experience when they believed that voluntarily 
foregoing pleasant experience or seeking pain (self-punishment) would be useful 
for goal pursuit. Further, to show that negative experience was sought for 
regulation of one’s behavior to achieve the failed goal, we found that only those 
primed to be persistent were more likely to do to so when experiencing guilt. 
Finally, the last two experiments showed that negative experience would only be 
sought if people believed that their personal qualities could change. This implies 
that negative experience was sought to ensure that they would behave differently 
in the future.  
To our knowledge, prior consumer research has only studied the effect of 
anticipated guilt on self-control. Guilt has been regarded as a cognitive element in 
people’s minds that can inhibit goal-inconsistent behavior if the association 
between the behavior and guilt is strong. However, few studies have examined 
what happens if people indeed feel guilty after behaving inconsistently with their 
long-term goals. Ours is the first empirical study to examine the consequence of 
guilt on hedonic consumption from a goal-regulation perspective, and fits the 
broader theoretical framework that regards feelings as feedbacks in terms of 
progress to a goal (Carver and Scheier 1990; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2006). We 
show that in addition to considering the affective consequence of a generic 
hedonic experience, people also interpret its compatibility with relevant goals.  
It should be noted, however, that our work only shows that negative 
experience may be sought as a means of self-correction for future goal pursuit. It 
does not rule out the possibility that some people may do this simply to get rid of 
the guilty feelings, especially in the interpersonal domain. Even in the 
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intrapersonal domain, however, it is possible that there are two primary drives 
behind the same behavior, and we have simply confirmed one of them with the 
moderators we used.  
One possible alternative explanation could be that perceptions of pain and 
pleasure can be changed when people are feeling guilty. As prior research on 
goals has suggested, if one goal is being activated, it may devalue the objects that 
are not relevant to the goal (Brendl, Markman, and Messner 2003). This 
explanation, however, does not explain why guilty people’s behavior would 
change as a function of their beliefs about the hedonic experience and the implicit 
personality theory.    
Future research should examine the downstream consequences of 
engaging in negative experience—that is, whether engaging in the negative 
experience would really help people to act goal consistently in the future. If there 
is a positive effect, how specific would it be? For instance, if a person engages in 
negative experience when he/she is feeling guilty of breaking a diet, would the 
negative experience make the person better at staying on the diet? Furthermore, 
after enduring negative experience, would the person’s self-control ability be 
increased in general, and would he or she also be better at resisting temptation 
across different domains?  
One limitation of the study is that we manipulated guilt using 
autobiographic tasks and laboratory experiments. To what extent our findings 
would hold for other elicitations of guilt—or apply to the field in broader terms—
awaits future assessment. In addition, we did not examine how extremity of 
feelings would influence the tendency to seek negative experience. Finally, it 
would be interesting to know whether different negative self-conscious emotions 
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